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CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING LAND VALUES

By Philip M. Raup, Professor
Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics
University of Minnesota

(Editor's Note:

Dr. Raup's Agri-Business Day address was largely developed from

the following paper prepared for presentation at a joint session of the American
Agricultural Economics Association with the American Economics Association, New
York, New York, December 29, 1977.)
Some Questions of Value and Scale in American Agriculture

A most revealing characteristic of an economic system is the value it places
on land. The modes by which that value is expressed and the methods of its
reckoning are identity criteria of fundamental significance. In a market

economy, the linkage between this value structure and the income flows that
support it provide a trend indicator that is akin to body temperature in the
human anatomy. Using this parallel, we must conclude that the American agri
cultural economy is feverish.

For the 48 contiguous states, agricultural land values tripled since 1967,
with over 80 percent of that increase occurring since 1972. The increase has
not been uniform among states, with the greatest increases centered in states
of the Corn Belt, and in North Dakota, Montana, Pennsylvania and West Virginia.
The smallest increase occurred in California, and increases were below the

national average in Arizona, New Mexico, the southern Great Plains and
Mississippi Delta states, and all states of the Southeast except Georgia,
South Carolina and Virginia (U.S.D.A. 1977a, p. 22). In broad terms, cash-

grain crop producers have benefited most from recent land value changes, while
producers of cotton, fruits and vegetables, other specialty crops, and animal
products have lagged behind.

Farm expansion buyers have been the dominant force in this recent upsurge
of land values, accounting for 63 percent of all purchases for the year ending

March 31, 1977. In Corn Belt counties (for example, in Southwestern Minnesota)
this figure approaches 80 percent (Christiansen, Nelson and Raup, 1977, p. 19,
see Chart I).

With some exceptions in areas adjacent to large urban centers,

these high farm land prices are not the result of an invasion of the farm
land market by non-farm buyers. The principal strength in the current land
market is provided by farmer demand for tracts of land to add to their holdings.
This is a reflection of the financial capacity created for existing

farmers by the windfall gains of land price inflation.

If a farm is debt-free

or burdened with only a small mortgage, an established farmer can spread the
cost of additional land over his entire acreage, and bid this advantage into
a higher price offer for any land that comes onto the market,
A recent study of Illinois farms shows that, if the farm-gate price of
corn is two dollars per bushel, it would have required the income-producing
capacity of approximately three acres to finance the purchase of one additional
acre, at 1976 production costs and land prices (Scott, 1977). This provides
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a rough measure of the extent to which land prices have been inflated by the
demand from farm expansion buyers. A farmer who is not in the top segment
of farm income receivers, and who does not own a substantial acreage of
debt-free land, is virtually priced out of the current land market.

The danger in this situation lies in the threat of land market instability.
For two years we have experienced the phenomenon of falling farm prices an
rising land values. One interpretation of the current land market is that

it exhibits many of the characteristics of an inflationary boom that is nearing
its bursting point. To assess this possibility we need data that we do not

have on the nature of the total demand structure for farm land.

The component of that structure for which we have the most copious data
is the demand for the products of land. In a recent discussion, Gardner has
suggested that "perhaps the demand curve facing American producers of

comlodities has become much more elastic as foreign demand has become more
significant in recent years and many more substitutes are available for

American-produced commodities. If so, price fluctuations would have been
reduced because of a given supply shift.

(Gardner, 1977, p. 189).

If Gardner is right, and the demand for American farm commodities has
become more elastic, this should be reflected in the derived demand for farm
land. It is difficult to interpret recent land market behavior as support
for this conclusion.

It is much more plausible to argue that the derived demand for farm land
foreign buyers of American farm commodities are in the market more or less
Independently of price. The Russian demand for American grain has been largely

has become less elastic with respect to price. Many of the most important

unaffected by price in several recent years. The stability of Japanese demand
for grain and soybeans since 1972 suggests that it has been in spite of
price, not because of it. This is also the most reasonable interpretation of
Chinese demand for American grain.

The five largest recipients of U.S. wheat in 1976-77 were Japan, the USSR,

India, the Republic of Korea, and Egypt, in that order. Among

accounted for A9 percent of all U.S. wheat exports in that year (U^A, 197^,

p. 17). It is improbable that price played an important role in their decisions
to import.

Other more direct sources of increased demand for farm land also contri
bute to inelasticity rather than to elasticity. Hobby farmers are often
insensitive to land prices, as are urban refugees seeking rural residences.

Foreign buyers of U.S. farm land include a number who are driven by a push-force
of fear of domestic instability rather than by the pull-force of

land. Tax-shelter demand for land is not unrelated to land prices, but there
is little evidence that land buyers seeking tax shelters are very sensitive
to land prices.

In short, it might be argued that the demand for farm land has become
more inelastic with respect to price in recent years. This would be consistent

with sharply increasing land prices in the face of falling farm commodity prices,
but it leaves us with a key question:

Is this a transitional phenomenon,

characteristic of the up side of a land market boom that is approaching its

peak? Or is it a more durable phenomenon, reflecting a genuine shift in the
demand curve for farm land?

An answer to this question must begin with recognition of the fact that a

greatly increased world demand for American grain and soybeans has created an
inflationary psychology, but this is not the only explanatory factor.

A variety

of institutional arrangements combine to give added purchasing power to pro

spective land buyers in high income brackets.

These include:

1)

The privilege of using cash-basis accounting.

2)

The preferential taxation of any prospective capital gains.

3)

The deductibility of interest on borrowed funds as a business
expense, in computing income tax liability.

A)

The investment tax credit.

5)

The several methods of computing accelerated depreciation.

In combination, these institutional features give a pronounced advantage
to a farm land buyer who is in a relatively high income tax bracket, has sub
stantial debt-carrying capacity, is highly mechanized in the production of

cash grain crops, and can make optimum use of the investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation. For example, a farmer with a combined federal and
state marginal income tax rate of 33 percent (not uncommon in cash grains
areas) and using a seven year depreciation schedule can obtain a present-

valued tax saving over the seven years equivalent to approximately 40 percent
of the cost of a new item of equipment. If his marginal tax rate is 10 percent
the tax saving is only 18 percent. If he has no net taxable income he must pay
the full price for the equipment item (Fuller, 1977, p. 3). It is not surprising
that the greatest increases in farm land prices in the past five years can be
traced to farm expansion buyers in cash-grain producing areas. Our institutional
structure has reinforced the impact of sharply rising grain prices, following
the sudden increase in world demand after 1972.

Any guarantee of farm commodity prices also exerts a differential impact on
farms in different size classes.

To the extent that a risk pf price collapse

is reduced, investment in the production of that commodity is made more attractive
to large-scale producers. This creates a dilemma in farm price support policy.
If the price is set high enough to cover the costs of high-cost, small-scale
producers it produces windfall gains for large-scale producers, enabling them
to buy out their small-scale competitors. Alternatively, it enables them to
bid up the price of land to levels that discourage the sons of smaller, familytype farmers from seeking careers in farming.
One of the greatest advantages of the single-proprietor of family-type
farm has been its capacity to absorb risk. If risk is to great, the farm will
fail.

But if risk is reduced i t increases the attractiveness of land owner

ship to non-farm investors, whose capital position enables them to take
advantage of the institutional features of our tax and credit policies outlined
above.

The possibility of a take-over of large segments of American agriculture
by non-farm capital is real, but on present evidence the current threat to
smaller family-type farms is not from outside investors or non-farm capital.
It is from the larger neighboring farms in the same community.

Conflicting economic forces and public policies have created this threat
of economic cannibalism within agriculture, in which the strong consume the
weak. We have credit policies that cheapen the cost of credit for larger
borrowers. We have tax policies that encourage vertical integration, agglom

eration, and farm size enlargement. We tax unearned income in the form of
capital gains more leniently than we tax earned income. We use investment
tax credits and accelerated depreciation to hasten the substitution of machines
for labor, with the result that these policies are of greatest advantage to
those sectors of the economy that are already most highly mechanized.

We

adopt farm commodity price support programs that are flat-rate supplements to
price, and thus yield benefits that are a linear function of output. If there
are any economies of size available through farm size enlargement, this system
gives a differentially larger reward to the larger firm. These policies are
not scale-neutral. Taken together, they create incentives for farm land buyers
to shift attention from efficiency and productivity criteria to a search for
rewards in the form of farm expansion, agglomeration and land value appreciation.

In the past, much of the discussion of farm problems has assumed that the
distortions of policy outlined above have been of principal value to non-farm
investors, large conglomerate corporations, or extremely wealthy individuals.
A phenomenon of the past five years has been the emergence of a segment of
farmers whose income levels, scale of business, and income tax obligations
make them effective users of price, credit, and tax policies that formerly
were of primary benefit to non-farmers.

It is ironic that when efforts have been made to shift to accural accounting,
reduce the preferenial taxation of capital gains, limit the deductibility of
interest on borrowed funds, remove the inequities of accelerated depreciation,
repeal the investment tax credit, or put a ceiling on government farm price
support payments, family-type farmers have usually opposed any of these reforms.
Policies that contribute to the decline of small or family-type farms, in short,
have been supported in most cases by family farmers.

Why is this a problem?

If small-scale or family-type farmers persistently

support policies that contribute to their downfall, why should this invoke a

public interest? Time and space limitations prevent any detailed exploration
of this issue, but the broad outlines of an answer can be indicated by a focus
on two dimensions:

The contribution of intermediate-scale farms

to innovation

and change processes, and the carrying costs of capital in farms of varying
scale.

At the lowest level of farm size, innovation becomes an impossibility
because risks of failure threaten family subsistence. The scale at which this
applies varies tremendously, from perhaps one acre in Java to a square mile in
the United States wheat belt. As we ascend the size-of-farm scale, the op
portunities for experimentation increase and the price of failure declines.
At some point relatively low on the size scale, there is an optimum range in
the ability of an individual or a firm to capture the rewards of successful

innovation without incurring unacceptably high risk. At smaller scale, the
risk is too great. At larger scale, the ability to retain the rewards of
innovation must be shared with others, and the time required to secure agree
ment to changes in traditional modes of technological behavior becomes excessive.
Medium-scale, family-size farms in the United States present an outstanding ex
ample of this principle, and consumers have been the major beneficiaries.

Competition among farms has insured the rapid diffusion of technological change,
and no farm or combination of farms has been able to restrict supply, control

price, or retain an unwarranted share of the benefits.
The failures that have occurred in this sifting and winnowing process have
been frequent, but they have also been small-scale. While often high-cost to
the individuals concerned, they have been low in social cost, to the total
economy. Change has been spread over time, and technological unemployment has
been accommodated through generational shifts rather than through lay-offs and
firings. This is the basis for the conclusion that a major strength of the
family-size farm is that it can fail at low social cost.

The significance of this conclusion can be measured by contrasting the
impact of technological change in corn and cotton production. Although there
were and are large-scale corn farms, single-proprietor family-type farms pre
dominated in corn production during the period of rapid introduction of hybrid
corn, and mechanization. This was accomplished without the destruction of
rural communities and without dumping large masses of displaced labor into
urban-industrial job markets. A much larger fraction of cotton production has
historically been produced on large-scale units operated with share-cropping
labor. Displacement of this labor through mechanization and the migration of

cotton production from the South to the high plains of Texas and the irrigated
lands of the Southwest has disorganized the rural communities from which cotton
departed and created a burdensome social cost for the cities to which displaced
cotton workers fled.

The lesson from American experience is clear. Large-scale farms resist
change, but when it comes, it comes with a rush and at high social cost. The
society has a direct interest in supporting a mix of farm sizes that will
minimize these costs.

A second measure of the public interest in the structure of farm sizes is
provided by the cost of capital.
If we abstract from highly space-intensive
livestock, dairy and poultry production, and fruit, nut and vegetable crops,
the cost of land remains the major item of capital investment in American agri
culture. And its fraction of total asset value has been increasing.
In current
dollars, farm land and buildings accounted for 63 percent of the total value of
assets in American agriculture in 1940, 57 percent in 1950, 64 percent in 1960,

68 percent in 1970 and an estimated 75 percent at the end of 1977 (Melichar and
Sayre, 1977, p. 37). In 1973 (the most recent year for which national estimates
are available and before the big increase in farm land values), the value of
farm land in current dollars was an estimated 254 billion compared to a total
value of all land used in manufacturing and non-farm, non-manufacturing busi
nesses of 206 billion (Kendrick, 1976, p. 77). Since 1973 the value of farm
real estate has doubled, and its fraction of the total value of all business
capital in land has increased sharply.
Farm land ownership has provided the
greatest opportunity to benefit from appreciation in asset values in an in
flationary period.

Who will supply this expensive land capital to the farming sector? The
conventional wisdom is that large-scale units are needed to attract and hold
capital in farming. As the fraction of land to total farm capital increases,
this argument has seemed to gain momentum. But the assumptions on which it
rests deserve a

closer look.

Large-scale business firms must receive a rate of return on land capital
equivalent to their opportunity cost of capital.
If they do not, they find
it exceedingly burdensome to immobilize large capital sums in illiquid invest
ments in land. To cover costs of production, large corporate or non-corporate
farm businesses must include the full opportunity cost of land capital in their
profit calculations.

The situation is sharply different with single-proprietor family-type farms.
With full economic rationality they can include in their calculation of rate

of return a variety of non-monetary rewards, including pride of ownership, con
tinuity of family, freedom of choice of work time and pace, and ability to
identify effort with reward. As Thurow has emphasized, the desire to own assets
is not adequately explained by the flows of money income they generate (Thurow,
1975, pp. 141-42). Power, authority, freedom, a purpose of life—these are
pervasive motive forces, and the role of public policy is to harness them for
the public good.
This has been achieved, although imperfectly, in proprietary types of
businesses and especially in family-type farms.

Their owners will hold the

large sums of land capital required at nominal rates of return that no largescale business can tolerate. This is not an error in calculation, nor is it
evidence of an imperfection in the market for land.
It is rather a reflection

of the fact that prospective owner-operators of farm land have opportunities to

value dimensions of intangible wealth that are denied workers in non-proprietary
businesses.

They can do this in their bid-prices for land.

This is a part of the explanation for the recent rapid run-up in farm land
values. Those aspects of intagible wealth that can be acquired with the purchase
of land have appreciated in relative value as they have become scarce in the
non-farm world.

Pride, status, and a sense of self-worth have been bid into the

price of farm land.

These same motives lead small-scale family-type farmers to

hold capital in land at low social cost.

In the short run, mobilization of

capital for farming may be more easily achieved by large-scale non-proprietary
or corporate units.

In the long run, the costs of this capital will have to be

covered by the price of food, or the capital will be withdrawn. Family-type
farmers will hold land capital at lower cost and without forcing the full costs
of carrying this capital into the national food bill.

A population of viable family-type farms is thus not only more efficient in
promoting innovation and adaptation to technological change, it will also carry
the required capital stock at lower rates of return. The public interest in
preserving this structure should be apparent. If it is not effective, we then
have two alternative policy options.

We can subsidize non-farm investors in

order to persuade them to carry farm land capital, or the public can own the
land.

We have gone a long way in the direction of subsidizing farm capital invest
The aspects of credit and tax policy outlined in
the early paragraphs of this paper are an attempt to equip non-owner operators
with bid-power in the farm land market that will offset at least in part the
advantages that prospective owner operators can gain from their ability to
include intangible values in their bid prices. This has not been the result of
ment by the non-farm sector.

any conscious public policy.

It arises instead from the insistent desire of

farm and non-farm investors to acquire a share of recent capital gains in land.

The culprit in this scenario is inflation. In a narrow sense of asset value
appreciation, no sector of the American economy has benefited more from in
flation than land owners in the grain belts, where family farming has been the
predominant type. In a longer run perspective, it is difficult to identify any
sector of the economy that has more compelling reasons to bring inflation under
control.

In the past decade farm land values have tripled, there has been

virtually no appreciation in the capital value of common stocks, and we have
witnessed a phenomenal growth in the demand for tax shelters in farming and
real estate. This has been one of the devices by which non-farm capital has

sought some measure of bidding equality with farm owner-operators in the farm
land market.

It is both a consequence and a cause of land price inflation.

If this policy choice is expanded, it promises to generate a form of taxshelter socialism for the rich.

Since the burden of these preferential tax

policies must be borne by other taxpayers, the cost of this method of attracting
capital to agriculture does enter the monetized sector. Instead of appearing in
the food bill, the costs of subsidies to non-farm investors appear in the form
of an altered incidence of taxation, and a distorted pattern of income distri
bution. The monetary costs can be calculated, but they are almost certainly
not as important as the political and social costs of the distortions and in
equities resulting from this method of providing capital to agriculture.

If we persist in these policies they will drive the full-time family-type
farmer out of farming. The agricultural structure that will emerge will consist
of a small number of large to very large units that can take maximum advantage
of credit, tax and price support policies, and a large number of small or parttime farms whose owners will reckon their return on capital in terms of amenity
values rather than monetary rewards.
We will have an opportunity to test the validity of this observation in
the course of the current debate over land costs and farm price support levels.
In the final analysis, this is really a debate over the desired level of land
values. Farm commodity prices must go up, or land values must come down. As
painful as it may prove to be, it is virtually certain that family-type farms
have more to gain from a downward adjustment in land values than from an upward
adjustment in commodity prices.
The risk-bearing capacity of the family-type

farm is its greatest comparative advantage. To the extent that risk is reduced,
the balance will be tipped toward an agricultural structure dominated by largescale, highly capitalized enterprises. The goal of agricultural policy is to
discover a middle ground, in which appropriate scales of farm size and technology
are relatively free from threats of destruction by either their enemies or their
friends.
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LAND USE ISSUES IN SOUTH DAKOTA

Agri-Business Day, S.D.S.U.
April 4, 1978
Galen Kelsey
Extension Public Affairs Specialist
South Dakota State University

South Dakota is oftentimes referred to as being the Land of Infinite

Variety. This characteristic of the state is a major part of the land use
problem in numerous ways. I make no claim however that our problems are
unique to South Dakota or are greater than the problems in other states.
Our problems might even seem insignificant in comparison to those encountered
•tn the more populous and rapidly growing states but nevertheless we do have
land use problems and they are real.

Land use problems are associated with growth so it is not surprising
that our most acute problems are around our growing cities and towns.

When I was asked to give this talk I wrote to all the directors of the
planning districts in South Dakota and asked them to list the land use problems
they are encountering. The universal answer was urban sprawl and the problems
associated with it, such as the indiscriminate and irreversible conversion

of prime agricultural land to non-ag uses, conflicts between agricultural
and non-ag uses of adjoining land, increased costs of local governments to
provide services such as prompt snow removal, bussing of school children,
and secondary road improvements and utilities.

One problem which has been given a large amount of publicity in eastern
South Dakota is the problem of obtaining sites for solid waste disposal.
More about

this l a t e r .

Another problem, which is part of the urban sprawl problem is the problem
of highway safety. The many approaches on what, a short time ago were rural
farm to market roads poses problems of traffic safety. School buses make
frequent stops to pick up or discharge children on the main road. In most
instances there are no set back requirements, consequently homes are built
close to the highway which, we know in this country, causes snow to collect
in the highway only to be piled on the edge and cause visibility problems
for cars entering the highway and incidently, high snow removal costs.

These are some of the chief problems but what are the underlying causes?
How did we get this way?

Ultimately, almost all aspect of human activity directly or indirectly
requires the use of land. Also, some activities use land very intensively
such as urban uses and some uses are extensive, such as agriculture,

forestry and outdoor recreation.
and some are not.

Some uses are compatible with one another

As a general rule in an open market situation especially in areas of
expanding population, land use moves from extensive to the more intensive
use.

When there is a demand for land to be put into intensive uses, agri

cultural uses, usually gives way to housing.

Housing in turn oftentimes is

converted to commercial or industrial uses etc.

For several hundred years in America, market forces controlled the

private use of land and the pricing mechanism worked quite well. As long as
there was plenty of land there was not much need to change the system. Land
was viewed as a commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace just like
any other commodity. The owner of the land was under few constraints on
how the land was used.

An almost unrestricted right to use the land as the

owner pleased came with ownership. Also, the major concern in land use
decisions were, and in most cases still are of a short-run interest rather
than the long terra future.

Conditions and concerns about land use is rapidly changing.

In addition

to land for agricultural production purposes, industrialization, population

growth, highways, rural electrification, and rural water systems created
greater and different types of demands for land. There became an increasing
awareness that the amount of land available is fixed, while the demands for

more land continued to grow.

This intensified the conflicts between

landowners and others relative to land use.

A need to change the system to cope with such emerging pressures became
evident in the early part of this century and as a result a third party was
interjected into the land use control system.

In any marketplace transaction there are two parties, the buyer and the
seller. The third party which entered into transactions involving the use
of land is society represented by the unit of government, city or county,
in the form of zoning and sub-division regulations. You have heard many

times the old cliche "a place for everything and everything in its place."
This is the purpose of zoning. Coupled with comprehensive planning, zoning
is designed to promote orderly growth and minimize conflicting uses of land
as well as public costs. It sounds like a great idea but it has its problems
too.

Some rather weird things happen to the price of land when zoning regulations
control land use.

Consider the case of two farmers living near a growing city.

One farm is on what we consider to be prime agricultural land.

The other is

on much poorer quality soil. The planning commission decides, and the elected
officials agree that prime agricultural land should remain in agricultural
and that the other land better be converted to residential or industrial use.

Zoning regulations are then developed to reflect this decision.

As a conse

quence of these decisions the poorer land might be platted and sold at
prices far in excess of the market value of the prime agricultural land.
We call these increases in value "windfall gains or windfall profits." The
actions of the planning commission might even depress the value of the
prime agricultural land if developments spring up nearby because prospective
buyers might fear higher taxes and restrictions which might be placed on
their agricultural operations such as air pollution (dust and odors), slow
moving vehicles on congested streets and highways, etc. We call these
losses in value "wipeouts."

This is just one example of how local governmental actions affect land
values. The same kind of phenomena occurs when public utilities such as water,
sewer, roads, etc. are extended into one undeveloped area and not another.
The value of developable land increases and undevelopable land decreases.

South Dakota is in a transition period.

Rural zoning is relatively new

here and most people are rather uneasy about how it will affect them. Most
counties, particularly those with larger towns within their boundaries have
comprehensive plans, zoning and sub-division regulations. Some are well
written and up-to-date and others are not so good.
In too many cases the

counties lack sufficient manpower to enforce their regulations. At the present
time it appears that dominant rural values are being imposed upon an urbanizing
segment of our state. As a consequence urban sprawl in many parts of the
state is growing unchecked.

In the rural parts of South Dakota bitter opposition to rural zoning is
evident. This is what I mean by my opening statement that being the Land of
Infinite Variety can pose problems in controlling land use. In the rural
counties of South Dakota and even the rural parts of urbanizing counties the
people resist attempts to restrict their use of the land. They do not see
the need and regard such regulations as an encroachment on their time honored
right to sell to whom they please and to use their land, and even abuse it,
as they wish.

Farmers on the urban fringe face a dilemma. They want the protection
for their farming operations that zoning provides and the valuation of their
land for tax purposes at agricultural value rather than speculative value.
But w^hen they want to sell their land they are like all of us. They want to
sell at the highest price they can get in the open market. On any urban
fringe we can find people who support rural zoning and those who oppose it
and probably for these reasons.
The problem of locating sites in rural areas for such key facilities
as sanitary landfills poses special problems and under our present laws
it will continue to be a major one. I think no person or family would want
a sanitary landfill nearby. Part of the problem is that people expect the
situation to be worse than it would be if it were developed. They visualize
the old city dump with the accompanying problems of rats, flies, smoke and
blowing debris. The modern sanitary landfill is much different. The
garbage is constantly being compacted and covered every day so pests do
not get an opportunity to propagate. The chief problem is traffic on rural
roads.

It appears that inequity is a basic problem. The city often does not
have a major problem purchasing the land becaus'=» they are willing to pay
substantially more for it than the market value in its present use. It is
the neighbors who have not received any windfall gains who must put up
with the nuisance. The situation will probably not change unless others
in the neighborhood are compensated for the nuisance inflicted on them

because of the development. If providing such a facility is a public
service, perhaps the public should be prepared to pay for the inconvenience
caused by it.

It appears then that windfalls and wipeouts along with our long standing
attitudes toward the rights of land ownership are the chief problems in South
Dakota.

The U.S. Constitution in the 5th Amendment protects the landowner against

the taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation.
Clearly when land is taken for highways or similar public purposes the landowner
can expect to be compensated for his loss. The 5th amendment does not protect
the landowners however, for loss of value in his or her land as a result of

public action.

There are a few exceptions to this rule such as when public

action makes the land inaccessible or renders it practically useless. These
cases usually end up in court. For the most part, however we do not have
laws or ordinances which serve to compensate the landowner for loss of value

due to public action, whether it be a zoning ordinance or undesirable
developments in the public interest.
In a few eastern states they are testing an idea which does spread the
windfall gains among all the people in the community rather than just to
the owner or owners of developable property. This idea is the transfer of

development rights. Very briefly, under this program all land within an area
is assigned a calculated number of development rights whether the land is
developable or not. If any of the land is sold for development purposes the
developer must also purchase the right to develop the land. He must purchase
more rights than those which go with the land when he bought it. He must
buy those extra rights from the other landowners in the area. Because he
must buy additional rights from other landowners this tends to lower the price
of developable land and other landowners are compensated for any possible loss
of value. Perhaps more importantly it tends to lower the speculative value
of land and discourages the conversion of ag land to non-ag uses.

As you can

guess, the program requires a lot of paperwork and the gift of prophesy to
determine how much land will be needed for development over a certain period
of time. The number of development rights assigned to all the land and the
number needed for development are based on these estimations.

New York has passed enabling legislation which allows farmers to establish
agricultural districts. The farmers in an area zoned agricultural may petition
their county board to establish a district. The procedure used to develop the
machinery of the district is about the same as for an irrigation or conservation
district in South Dakota. If a district is formed land may still be converted
to non-agricultural uses. However, the farmers who keep their land in

agriculture cannot be assessed for urban type improvements such as curb and
gutter or water and sewer improvements. Furthermore, their land is taxed at
agricultural value rather than at speculative value.

The agricultural district idea does not in any way affect the windfall
and wipeout problem but does protect the farmer from high taxes and assessments
which might force him to sell for development when he might otherwise
continue

to

farm the land.

What are we doing in South Dakota to slow the growth of urban sprawl and
to eliminate the windfall and wipeout problem?

In at least two counties ordinances have been passed requiring 36 or 40

acres for every rural residence. In one county the number of such 40 acre
plots is limited to one per quarter section on the best agricultural land.
This scatters the new residences over a wider area which gives a larger number

of rural landowners the opportunity to reap windfall profits on the sale of
land and it also keeps the wipeouts to a minimum because it maintains a
relatively low population density. The other county does not have the
restriction on the number per quarter section so there is very little impact
upon the problem of windfalls and wipeouts. Anyone who desires to build in
the country can buy 36 acres, get his building permit and sell the unneeded

land back to the farmer to be sold again.

I might add that in the county with the one residence per quarter section
limitation, a dissident group is attempting to repeal the ordinance and the
case is in court at the present time.

Few, if any, will deny that cities should have room to grow. As a matter
of fact, the United States Supreme Court has made this very clear in several
recent zoning cases. After having made this decision they leave the manner in
which a city grows up to the city so long as all types of housing to accommodate
all are provided for.

It makes a difference to the taxpayer how a city grows.

A recent study

in the Rapid City ar^a, by a member of our staff there, Arnold Bateraan, showed
that scattered development increased cost to local government over the
additional taxes collected by an amount about equal to the cost of transporting
the school children.

This is no small item today.

Furthermore, he did not

include the cost of police and fire protection because the local government did
not increase their manpower.

Another study of Gretna, Nebraska by the University of Nebraska, Omaha
compared the costs to local government of two separate developments, one a
compact development and the other scattered. Their study revealed that
school costs were 82% higher per household in the scattered development than
in the compact development. They also estimated the crop production lost
because of the scattered development and determined a loss of 263 bushels of
lost grain production, per home, over the amount lost in a compact sub-division.
Is this loss of crop production important?

A few years ago when it

appeared there was a shortage of food in the world there was a lot of interest
in the preservation of agricultural land. Now that we are back in a surplus
situation and low grain prices, interest in preserving ag land has declined.
If we look at history however, we know that food shortages is the norm and
that surpluses are a recent phenomenon. The irreversible conversion of prime
agricultural land to other uses may or may not be important in the future but
I don't believe society can afford to gamble on it.

I don't have any
what I have been able
is an answer, it will
commissions and local
in their counties and

pat, easy solutions to our land use problems and from
to learn it doesn't appear that anyone does. If there
be in the day to day efforts of our local planning
governmental officials to inform and involve the citizens
toxrms in solving each problem as it comes along. Working
together they are most likely to build the kind of communities in which people

want to live.

Now, in conclusion I have just a few pictures which illustrate some of
the problems I have been talking about.

PRESENTATION OF HONORED AGRI-BUSINESS PERSON OF 1978

By John E. Thompson

In the selection of the Agri-Business Person of the Year we have attempted,
over the years, to have leaders selected from major agri-business sectors of

our economy. This year we have selected an individual from our most important
agri-business sector in South Dakota — the business of production of agricultural
products. We are very happy and proud to honor John E. "Matt" Sutton, Jr., a
rancher and community and state leader from Agar, South Dakota.

John E. "Matt" Sutton, Jr., was born on the Sutton ranch at Agar, South Dakota
in 1931.

He attended rural grade schools and graduated from high school at

Onida, South Dakota.

"Matt," as he is known, received a degree in Animal

Science from South Dakota State University. I'Jhile at South Dakota State
University he was also active in student government, junior livestock judging
and football.

Matt was a 2nd Lt. in the infantry and after military service he returned
home to help his father and uncles run the ranch which his grandfather established
in 1897. Today he owns and operates his o^to ranch which is part of the original
unit. It is a combination cattle and farming operation. Matt has irrigated
from the Oahe Reservoir since 1966. He currently irrigates 950 acres of various
crops.

The Sutton ranch has been well known as a source of cattle seedstock for

many years, particularly for their registered Herefords.

The Sutton's have

also maintained a private herd of buffalo since 1909. They have an annual
buffalo calf crop sale along with their registered quarter horses each fall.

Matt's operation still has a few horses, and his family interest in the 60
head of buffalo, but he recently sold his registered Hereford herd to his uncle.
He now concentrates on irrigated crops and his commercial cattle herd which
includes many of the so called "new breeds."
Matt has been involved in public and livestock organization affairs for
many years.

His responsibilities in agricultural activities have included

being President of the South Dakota Quarter Horse Association, serving on the
Board of Directors of the South Dakota Stockgrowers Association, the South
Dakota Hereford Association, the South Dakota Livestock Production Records
Association, and the National Beef Improvement Federation. He has also served

as Horse Superintendent at the South Dakota State Fair, on the County Soil
Conservation District Board, the Sully County Planning Commission, and as a
4-H project leader.

Matt served four years in the South Dakota Legislature. He was later
co-chairman of Governor Kneip's Council for Tax Decision, and also served two

years as Chief Clerk of the South Dakota House of Representatives. A year ago
he completed a six year term on the South Dakota Board of Regents for Higher
Education, including two years as Chairman of the Board.

In addition to managing his own ranch he is a Director of the Sully County
Bank in Onida.

He is also President of Sutton, Thomas and Levis Cattle of

Harrold, South Dakota, a purebred simmental cattle operation which has produced
grand champions at six of the largest shows in the nation in the past two years.

Currently his public service responsibilities include President of the
South Dakota State University Ag Advisory Committee and as a member of the
State Planning Commission for Education.

Matt is married to the former Helen Tande of Arlington, South Dakota, and

they have two children, a daughter, Nancy, who is in Dallas, Texas, and a son,
John III, who is in the second grade at Agar.

COMMENTS BY HONORED AGRI-BUSINESS PERSON OF 1978

John E, "Matt" Sutton, Jr.

In the past few years I've become very Intrigued with the study of economics,
It is sobering when you think of the impact economists have had on the world;
people like Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Lord Keynes. The list is short of people
who have had more influence over more people's lives than they did. Today,
in government and in business, economists are the modern mystics. Lord Keynes

predicted the demise of economics. Quite the opposite is true, in terms of
activity at least. Though the numbers are great, the one that can map a
path out of our economic wilderness and get a majority to follow him has yet
to come forward.

Today is Agri-Business Day so I'm going to talk about the business of
agriculture as I see it. Agriculture makes a lot of news these days, and the
American Agriculture Movement can take much of the credit.

Most people say

they agree with their goals but disagree with their methods. I'm different
I guess. I question their goals, but am awe-stricken by their methods, and
the success they have achieved. There is no question in my mind that they
are responsible for any changes that come about this spring in the current
farm law. Fact is I'm down right frightened by the impact that such a group
is able to have on our government which is supposed to represent the epitome
of responsible deliberations.

Agriculture has troubles but we are not alone; our whole economy has
problems. We've put ourselves into an inflationary trap from which there seems
no escape. Our market system economy is designed to work so that the buyer
sets the price. We find ourselves now in a situation where organized power
groups, be they labor, business, or government, have undue influence in the
market place. Even organized consumers have contributed to inflation. Agri
business has been adversely affected. Galbraith's countervailing power theories
do not work for agriculture. Many farmers ^ agree with Galbraith in that

they are being exploited.

I am not yet willing to admit that I've been

exploited. I do think that agriculture as a whole is pulling the wagon the
rest of the country is riding in. I'm still hoping that someone can convince
the people in the wagon that they at least have to push a little if they
aren't willing to pull. I'm still hoping this will happen before the farmers
all get in the wagon, but time is getting short.

Politicians have had the farmers on milk replacer long enough. It's
about time they put a little hard feed in the ration. They talk in terms
of doing this and doing that for the farmer but the only one who has really
had guts enough to say it like it is is Congressman Nolan from Minnesota.
He has authored the only bill I've seen that could produce 100% parity. It
would put agriculture in a strait jacket and you'd have to have a license to
farm, but it tells it like it is. You don't hear many farm groups falling
over themselves to support it.

Since 1930 we've had experience with nearly every conceivable type of

farm program except administration by an agriculture commission.

I'd see that

as more an admission of failure of respresentative democracy than a solution.
We know what it takes to keep commodity production under control with our

experience in tobacco and peanuts.

It's at the point with tobacco where

acreage allotments now include poundage allotments with all the necessary
government employees to check compliance.
Tobacco has lost export markets.
As of 1967 an acre of tobacco allotment was worth $6,015 to a farm; this
according to an article in the February Intellect. It also said in one Kentucky
county 52% of the landlords and 50% of the tenants had incomes of less than
$3,000 in 1969. The results are obvious, price has been maintained, production
has been controlled, the farmer has been saved if he had a farm, but what
has been gained? The Talmadge and Dole Bills with the acreage restrictions

are new approaches to old ideas. They look great but all objective economists
can point out dangers to our general economy. From an agricultural standpoint
the effect on animal agriculture could be serious because it will reduce con

sumption thru higher meat prices and force down the price of feeder animals
just when recovery is underway.
The clamor for import controls is close to bearing fruit.
I happen to believe
that if we are going to have a meat import law it should be counter-cyclical.
I don't believe I have to explain that approach to this group.
I do think
we'd all be better off if there was some way of leveling off beef production
cycles that seem now to have become worldwide. My belief today is that it
would be extremely dangerous to get any trade bill on the floor of Congress.
Taken as a whole no farmer should talk of trade restrictions. Nearly a third
of our sales depends on exports.
Even Canada has a 3 to 1 ag trade disadvantage
with the U.S.
It appears that only sugar has to have strict trade restrictions.
Beef may need some protection, but I for one am not willing to risk the
whole area of world trade on the floor of Congress. Last year Congress came
within one vote of passing a trade restriction bill on hand tools out of
committee.
The President has just put a substantial tariff on CB radios. Pro
tectionism is running at high tide right now.
It would be tragic if agriculture
would be the segment of our economy that would tip the scales in favor of
protectionism. Not only would we lose our markets, we would see prices of
many things we buy virtually without competition.

I won't go into it here but a historical review of the Smoot-Hawley Bill
of 1930 might be in order. It started as a protection measure for farmers and
came out with something for everybody. We know what followed.
Whether SmootHawley was at fault or not, most historians give it some blame. Roosevelt and
Churchill vowed in the dark days of 1942 that the world should have free inter
change of goods unhampered by artificial barriers.
I realize at times world
trade seems unfair, but not to American agriculture. We have a mechanism for
negotiating world trade. Let's improve it, not risk destroying it.

There is no easy fix for agriculture's problems, but there are some things
we can change. The first is our state of mind. We must realize we are not
the only economic segment with problems and that we are all in this world
together. I realize this is hard to accept when we read about wage settlements
for coal miners and truck drivers or when we read the annual reports of
Pillsbury, Cargill or General Motors; or when we read of automatic pay raises
for millions of government employees. Still, the cold hard truth is that
inflation is real and deadly serious for us all.
I keep hoping somebody can

stop this runaway before we crash.

I'm convinced if agriculture gives up,

the crash is imminent.

There are a couple other traditional thoughts that make agriculture
increasingly more unwilling to pull the wagon for everyone else.
One is the
belief that people are always forced off the farm instead of attracted off,
and the second is that every farm youth has an inherent right to farm.

Just recently I heard of a case where a son had bought out the other members
of his family on a long-term deal and started farming. He works hard, is

totally diversified and should be able to make it.

The thing that concerned

me was that his folks seemed to feel the government had the responsibility

of guaranteeing him a profit.

The government has a responsibility to provide

a climate where he has a good chance of making a profit, but they have no

right to guarantee that everybody who puts a plow in the ground becomes
wealthy; and lets face it, every farmer who makes it is wealthy by most
accepted standards.

We must decide some goals for agriculture.

I think Congressman Nolan

has presented a well .thought out, logical plan for agriculture and it is an

attainable goal if there is a national commitment.

I personally wouldn't

like it and would consider it a national mistake but at least he's the first

politician I know to come forth with something besides political pablum.

I

am inclined to feel that it is more directed toward social goals than economic

goals.

What's the difference?

Texas newspaperman Jno Owens once said

"economics translated to English is bacon and eggs."

The social end under

Nolan's bill could well be federalized peasantism.

I think another attainable goal is big or corporate farms.

It would

require some, but less national commitment than for all family farms. There
is a great fear of big agriculture, but it is because big farms are a social
concern rather than economic. I don't think they w^ill cause higher food prices
and could well be the most efficient way of providing the countervailing power

agriculture needs. Farms are getting bigger but that is not all bad and
probably necessary. The successful big farms I know of are owned by sons of
the soil.

I think big agriculture will never totally take over without help because
some forms of agriculture never will lend themselves to impersonal management
especially animal agriculture. At the turn of the century only a few herd
owners grazed most of western South Dakota. They are gone. Just recently
in our area I've seen the heir of cannon towels throw in his towel.

From our

own experience, our family owned a large range in northwestern South Dakota.
It was unsuccessful for several reasons many of which we could not control,

but mainly it was not diversified enough and had all hired labor. IVhen it
sold five years ago, it was divided among five neighbors one of which was
a man who worked for us; who had started with nothing and now has a ranch.
They are still in operation.

I'm sure big farms are facing utlimate unionism and most any farmer should
be able to compete with that if the government insures open markets. If big
farms are a menance, current agricultural policy contributes to it.

I

don't fear big agriculture, but I hate to see their growth encouraged by
government subsidies. Expansion of present policy will create a large class
of tax supported millionaires.

I think we are naive if we suggest that the government get out of

agriculture. I think we are just as naive to think 100% of parity or any other
power-marketing concept could involve as many producers as we have without
involving the police power of the state.

I also think any income transfer program based on units of production
or percent of capital is self-defeating for family farms. I agree with Don
Paarlberg who said in his book American Farm Policy, "No question about it:
to whatever degree the price supports raised average farm income this was

done by widening the dispersion of income within agriculture."

I think there

has been a direct correlation in our county between farm payments and land

acquisition.

It's commonly accepted that government payments are soon

capitalized in land values so it follows that big grain farmers who get the
bulk of government payments can outbid the diversified farmer for land.
Mayer, Heady and Madsen of Iowa State did a study in which they simulated
no farm programs and computed the results.

They came to the conclusion

that the net income of farm operators would have been about 25% lower than

the average farm income actually was for 1965 and 1967. Probably we'd get no
argument there, but what was interesting to me was that the estimated return
to family and hired labor would have been more than 10% higher than it
actually was in 1967..

The point I have been trying to make is that if the family farmer is to
survive it is going to have to be because of returns to his labor and farm
management ability. Not through a contest with his neighbor for governm.ent
subsidies. I have no fight with the big farmer that got that way by hard
work and good judgment. I do resent farmers that got big or rich because
they were able to figure out and anticipate government programs or worse yet
influencing them in their favor. Currently people are attempting to get a
farm program that will enable farmers to make a living by working six

months each year. For a lot of farmers that has already been achieved and
I have no quarrel if he gets no subsidy. I still think a farmer, if he wants
to be called a farmer, should be willing to slop the hogs and pull the lambs
before he can complain. The market system is crying for sheep, and production

is down again this spring.

Eventually, if some people have their way we'll

either run out of sheep or the government will force us to raise them because
who would raise sheep if he can make a living in grain farming. No offense
to you sheep lovers but your numbers are declining.
I still think an attainable goal is maintainence of a free, widely dispersed

agriculture system like we still have.

Emphasis must be on the fully employed

diversified farmer, but with no conscious restrictions on any other type.

To maintain and improve this system we should eliminate self-defeating
programs for the family farmer based on payments per bushel or on a percentage
of acres o\^med or operated. Also, contradictory ag programs are numerous,

often discriminating against fully employed farmers, and must be re-examined.
I'm opposed to payment limitations because they would discriminate against the
efficient big farmer if they were effective. I'd leave all income transfer
programs to Health, Education and Welfare Department. This would be a bitter
pill in many cases but the alternative is worse.

I think most tax shelters for agriculture should be eliminated including,
but not limited to, tax exempt capital gains on cattle, investment credit
and accelerated depreciation. This is not because these are unfair to non

ag taxpayers, in fact I feel they may benefit, but because they have little
value to a struggling farmer and probably even drive his costs up. I also
think tax farming contributes to wild swings in the cattle business.
I cringed when I saw those guys driving the goats up the steps of the
capitol. I cringe even more when I read of farm organizations pleading poverty
on one hand and for tax shelters on the other.

would be a legitimate exception in my opinion.

Reduced estate taxes on farms

Disaster, loan, and storage programs are necessary and valuable for
their stabilizing and orderly marketing effects. They must be carefully
used, and even then abuse is inevitable.

Loan rates must not drive us out

of world markets and storage payments themselves dare not be profitable on
all stored grain.

The government must help develop and insure access to all markets,
domestic and world, but they shouldn*t tamper in the marketplace. I*ve
recently been in contact with a large hamburger chain. They were unwilling
to assume the risks that the farmers are forced to take as far as raising
and feeding cattle. That is both good and bad. Good, in that they stay out
of our business, bad .in that they operate in the secure world of profits and
expansion while expecting us to take the risks and be the shock absorber.
If a profit were secure they'd sure want in our business. On the other hand
their desire for and ability to make a profit selling hamburgers has created a
previously undreamed of demand for ground beef. We dare not tamper with that
profit motive.

Government has a responsibility in research, and not just in efficient
production.

The only direct income transfers that I'd have outside of H.E.W. would
be soil conservation payments. I would make some practices profitable, not
just cost sharing, with on-going maintanence payments for approved practices.
Agriculture as a whole must not throw in the towel.

There are bound

to be some new uses for our products and new products to grow.

I'm not a

gasohol enthusiast, but that doesn't mean it's not possible. Building
materials and paper production may have ag potential. After investigating
the hamburger market I'm sure no one knows the best way to produce hamburger;
and it will soon represent one-half of our beef sales. Some predict hamburger
will go to 60% of sales. Today the industry just finds hamburger where they
can. Over 6 years ago, I gave a speech where I said I didn't know if we
could compete with imported beef, but I knew we'd never tried. That statement
is still true, but I think it is about time we tried.

It is not unreasonable for a farmer to feel exploited.

I can sure under

stand why, but all of us are in agriculture by our own choosing. I think
agriculture is our country's strength, but more because of high production
than prices received. We dare not jeopardize that production capacity by
recimented farming, subsidized cutbacks or unfair production incentives which
distort the market place.

I think the dispersed, family-entreprenuer type agriculture is possible
without direct raids on the federal treasury. Hopefully sometime soon our

nation will come to its senses and somebody will help the fanner pull the wagon,
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GRAIN PRICE AND FOREIGN TRADE OUTLOOK
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Arthur B. Sogn
Extension Economist, Grain Marketing
South Dakota State University

Fundamentals seem to indicate very little chance for substantial price

improvement in any of our U.S. grains for 1978. The projected carryover supplies
of wheat are about 60 percent of one year's production, corn 18 percent, barley
43 percent, sorghum 26 percent, oats 42 percent, and soybeans 13 percent. This
implies that in spite of reduced plantings indicated for many 1978 grains supplies
for 1978 will be as great as in 1977 because of the large carryover supplies.
For this time of year projections must be made on the assumption of a normal
crop.

There are some reasons why we believe grain prices for wheat and feed grains

may be higher by the fall of 1978. First, weather conditions make a world
crop comparable to those of 1975, 1976 and 1977 very improbable. Second, export
demand for U.S. grains is currently very good, and three, it appears that U.S.

ag policy must support grain prices at a higher level than it is currently doing.

U.S. Grain Exports

Grain exports have a direct relationship to U.S. carryover supplies as 54
percent of wheat, 25 percent of feed grains and 60 percent of soybeans raised
in 1977 went for export. The demand for U.S. grains for export is currently
very good. There are more ships in the Gulf of Mexico than has been seen there
since the bonanza export year of 1972. Projections at this time are for a
record export year of agricultural products in volume, but not in value. Agri

culture exports are projected below last years record of $24 billion, to some
where around $22.5 billion figure. Volume is expected to raise from around 102
million metric tons last year to about 111 million metric tons this year.
Projected exports of major U.S. grains during the respective crop years are:
Corn

Wheat

1,750 million bushels
1,100 million bushels

Barley

60 million bushels

Oats

10 million bushels

Sorghum
Soybeans
Total

225 million bushels
625 million bushels

3,770 million bushels

Agriculture exports have saved the U.S. economy from possible disaster the past
few years with their contribution to the balance of trade. Ag exports contributed
$12.4 billion to the balance of trade in 1975, $12.3 billion in 1976, $10.6
billion in 1977, and it's projected to contribute around $9.0 billion in 1978.
The contribution to the balance of trade is that balance that ag exports exceed
ag imports.

Volume of U.S. Agricultural Exports

1976

Commodit

1977

1978

(Million metric tons)
Wheat and flour

30.61

24.72

31.0

Feed grains

49.86

50.60

Rice

Soybeans
Vegetable oils
Oilcake and meal

Cotton, including linters

1.95

2.23

51.6
2.2

15.05

15.16

16.6

.89
4.87

1.14

1.2

4.34

4.5

.77

1.03

1.0

.27

.30

.3

Fresh fruit

1.37

1.35

1.4

Animal fats

1.03

1.38

1.3

106.67

102.24

111.1

Tobacco

1

Forecast.

SOURCE:

2

Totals may not add due to rounding.

Ag Outlook AO-30, March 1978.

Value of U.S. Agricultural Exports'
Fiscal Year

1977

($ Bil.)
Western Europe
European Community
Other Western Europe
Eastern Europe
USSR
West Asia

South Asia

7.21

8.61

5.69
1.52

1.78

1.29
2.05

1.09

6.83
.98

7.43

8.13

.82

1.10

1.14

.68

22.76

24.01

Southeast and East Asia

(excl. Japan and PRC)
Japan
PRC

Canada

North Africa
Other Africa
Latin America
Oceania

Adjusted for transshipments through Canada and Western Europe.

\ess than $50 million. ^Totals may not add due to rounding.
SOURCE:

Ag Outlook AO-30, March 1978.

1975

1976

1977

1978*

Ag Exports (billions of dollars)
Ag Imports (billions of dollars)

21.9

22.8

24.0

22.5

9.5

10.5

13.4

13.5

Ag contributions to balance of trade

12.4

12.3

10.6

9.0

^Projected
It is interesting to speculate at this time that i f c u r r e n t agricultural
policy could raise the price of the major U.S. grains by 50 cents a bushel, the

contribution to the balance of trade could increase by nearly $2 billion a year.
There are possible problems in reaching the grain export projections for
1978, in spite of the excellent demand.
(1) The explosions that racked the
export elevators on the Mississippi River and on the Gulf of Mexico reduced our

loading capacity by 10 percent.

(2) The weather has slowed shipments.

Excessive snow, water and a delayed opening of some of the main rivers for
navigation are the main weather-related deterrents to shipping grain.

(3) Threatened farmer holding of grain and (A) a current shortage of railroad
equipment for loading grain in the country could also delay grain shipments for
export.

Reaching the 1978 projections for export grain means the flow of grain must
flow steadily, without interruption.
The total deficit in our export trade, which includes agricultural and

industrial was nearly $27 billion last year (1977). Oil imports are the largest
contributor to the deficits, currently costing about $A0 billion a year.

1977 Economic Issues

Most likely the most discussed economic issues in 1977, and so far in 1978
is the decline in the value of the dollar.

The value of the dollar effects

nearly every person in the U.S. in one way or another.
A lower value dollar
will make the coffee, cocoa, Toyotas, Volkswagons, cameras and anything made in

foreign countries, more expensive comparatively. Conversely, it will make our
items for export a better buy. Before those of us closely related to agriculture
take joy in what a declining dollar may do to the demand for our grains and
other products, we must also remember it also makes our farms, processing plants,
export elevators, etc., better buys for foreigners also.
Since the summer of 1977, the U.S. dollar has declined as much as 10 to 15

percent in relationship with the Swiss Franc, the Deutsche Mark, the Japanese
Yen, and yes, also the British Pound. We have about kept pace with the Canadian
dollar because it too has declined in value. The dollar has declined 5 percent
already in 1978 in relationship to the yen.
The main causes of

the decline in the value of the dollar are the billions

of dollars we are spending abroad for oil, and the lack of confidence in our
currency because of the large deficit in our balance of trade. The slowing

economies of Europe and Japan have also contributed to our problems by having
them push their exports, but slow down their imports.
The dollar will adjust upward again sometime, but then the inverse of a

declining dollar will result in its relationship to agricultural trade. In the
meantime, we should attempt to sell as much grain for export as we can to rid
ourselves of the price depressing carryover supplies of imany of our grains.

To avoid any misunderstanding, a declining dollar does not always promise a
more competitive price situation for our grains. Some countries use import
restrictions and levies to offset this advantage.

1978 Farm Expenses

An integral part of how farmers fare in a given year is what happens to
their expenses. Farmers should not experience any increase in agricultural
chemicals and fertilizer for 1978. Supplies are plentiful and use of chemicals
should be stable, and there may be a small reduction in the use of fertilizer.

Energy is expected to continue its rise in cost.

Supplies of fuels should be

adequate, but always uncertain. In total, 1978 farm expenses should show only
a slight increase over 1977. Farm expenses increased about 5 percent in 1977
but because of the large crops were not so significant. Farm expenses could
be considerably higher in 1978 in relation to production.
There are several indications that the worst is over for farmers and there

are better days and years ahead. There are too many indicators to mention here,
however, of special note is that total world supplies were able to increase

substantially only 1 year of the three (1975-1977) large world crop year.

In

other words, world consumption is increasing faster than production based on
normal world production. It really is true we may need our grain reserves, but
we must not bankrupt our farmers waiting for that seemingly inevitable time.

Fuel and Energy Prices Paid by Farmers

Diesel

Month and Year

Fuels and Ener

Gasoline

1976

January
April
July
October

1977

January

43.1

April
July

44.8

October

45.7

45.0

1978

January

Bulk delivery

Selected Farm Production Expenses

Account

1976

($ Bil.)
Feed purchased
Livestock purchased
Fertilizer

Repair and operation
Hired labor
Interest

Depreciation
Taxes on property

Total production expenses

For calendar year.

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON LIVESTOCK OUTLOOK

Agri-Business Day, S.D.S.U.
April A, 1978
Gene E.

Murra

Extension Economist, Livestock Marketing
South Dakota State University

Many factors have an impact on the price and profit outlook for livestock.
These factors include both those within the industry, such as numbers, weights
and grades of livestock, and those external to the industry, such as grain
prices, foreign trade and consumer income. Because there are so many factors
which affect price outlook, it is virtually impossible to predict exactly what
will happen and, recently, an acceptable prediction might be one that merely
is in the ballpark. Certainly, it seems that it is much safer to predict longterm trends than day-to-day occurrences. Too many people remember what was
predicted for onlv a day, week or month in advance but might forget after
enough time passes.

Rather than attempt to cover all factors, this presentation will focus
on the major developments which recently have occurred in the hog and cattle
industry. The impact of these developments also will be covered.

Hog Outlook

Recent developments - The most dramatic development in the hog industry
was the March 1 hog and pig inventory released by the USDA on March 21.

Comments on the report were mostly in the "shocked," "surprised," or "disbelief"
categories. An indication of "what was expected" versus what the report
included can be seen in the following table.

Table 1.

A Comparison of Expected to Actual Inventory Estimates, Hog and

Pig Report, March 1, 1978.^
Expected
Categon

Minimum

Maximum

Average

Actual

(Percentage of Year Earlier Figures)

Expected figures are those obtained from livestock market analysts
surveyed before the report was released while actual figures are those
contained in the USDA report dated 21 March.

The wide disparity between what was expected (a relatively large increase)
to the actual report (very small increases and even a decrease) surprised the
industry. That is, most analysts expected relatively large supplies of hogs

and pigs, something which would depress prices.

The actual report showed fairly

stable numbers, s'^mething which would cause a bullish market.

Other recent developments include (1) an extension of time to the pork

industry to evaluate and change the use of nitrates in cured products, (2) a
widespread concern about pseudorabies and (3) the impact of a relatively bad
winter.

Outlook - Of the above recent developments, the March 1 report had and
will continue to have the greatest impact. Prior to the report most price

expectations were in the $40-50 range for 1978, with an average in the low
$40's. Some possibility for prices in the mid to upper $30's also existed.
Currently, most price expectations are in the $45-55 range, with an average
in the mid to upper $40's. Again, some predictions include price swings to
as low as $40 and as high as $60, although only for short periods of time. As
can be seen in Figure 1, such a price level would be comparable to the first
half of 1976 and above the levels achieved in the last half of 1976 and most
of 1977.

Other recent developments noted earlier also can play a role. The re
The pseudorabies

laxation of the nitrate ban should help on the demand side.

problem could affect the supply side and the past bad weather probably already
has affected supply.

Certainly, there is no guarantee that prices will achieve the levels
However, the level of inventories, the relatively good condition
of consumer demand and prices of major substitutes would all lend considerable
optimism to hog industry outlook. Certainly, there is more optimism now than
only a few months ago. The degree of change in hog outlook probably can best
be seen in Table 2. Futures prices for hog contracts for selected days are
presented. It is easy to see that the mood changed from October to now. The

noted above.

big change in prices between March 21 and March 28 is due to the March Hog and
Pig Report noted earlier.

One final comment.

The strong market now along with expected high prices

could eventually cause some problems. Consumers may rebel if prices at the
retail level get too high and too much expansion may occur if profit—level
prices continue.

Table 2.

Daily Closing Prices for Live Hog Contracts

w.«K

1977

6

5

1973

January

February

9 16 23 30 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 1

220 lb. HO^S Kansas City

6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26 2

i

3

ANNUAL AVERAGE

Choice 200 -

Figure 1

November

December

8 15 22 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 1 8 15 22 29

20

Cattle

Recent Developments - A major development in the cattle area also concerned

an inventory report, in this case the January 1, 1978 Cattle and Calf Inventory
released on January 30. Although this report was not as surprising as the hog
report, the amount of inventory decrease was surprising to many. Total
inventory declined by five percent, while beef cow numbers declined by six
percent (Table 3). Total decreases since January 1, 1975 were approximately
16 million head.

Both the rate and amount of decrease in cattle numbers were

greater than that noted in the 1930's, a period of rapid cattle inventory
reduction.

Table 3.

January 1 Cattle Inventory"
1976

1977 to 1978

1977

% Change

Million Head

Cattle and Calves

132.0

128.0

122.8

116.3

Cows and Heifers that
56.9

55.0

Beef Cows

45.7

43.9

52.4
41.4

Milk Cows

11.2

11.1

11.0

have calved

Heifers 500 pounds & over
For Beef Cow replacement
For Milk Cow replacement
Other Heifers

Steers 500 pounds & over
Bulls 500 pounds & over

Heifers, Steers, and Bulls
under 500 pounds

^Some class totals may not add due to rounding. ^ercents calculated from
unrounded numbers.

South Dakota was one of about a

both all cattle and beef cow numbers.

were the largest of any state.

dozen states which had an increase in

In both cases, increases in South Dakota

The states cattle inventory went from 3.65

million head to 3.925 million head, while the beef cow inventory increased
from 1.378 to 1.478 million head.

Other recent developments affecting cattle outlook included more discussions
on meat and cattle imports, cattle on feed reports, and the previously noted •
hog report.

Outlook - The impact of the inventory report and the total inventory
picture in general are the major factors in cattle outlook. Numbers of cattle
are at a managable level and, as a result, there is considerable optimism.

This optimism is noted both in the feeder cattle and fed cattle areas, at
least in terms of price. The profit picture is the fed cattle area depends

both on grain prices (note comments by Art Sogn earlier) and feeder cattle
prices. High prices in both of those areas could reduce profits in the fed
cattle market. Currently, projections are for prices to be above levels
noted during the last two or three years. Estimates range from a minimum of
$5 above the higher 1976-77 levels to $15 above lower 1976-77 levels per
hundredweight for fed steers and from $10 above the highest 1976-77 levels
to $25 above the lower 1976-77 feeder calf prices.
Figures 2 and 3 can be
used as a basis for 1976-77 prices.
Higher feeder cattle prices are a
result of the smaller inventory, as noted in Table 4.
In addition, higher
feeder cattle prices can erase much or all of the profit in the feedlot, even
when fed cattle prices are high.

Table 4.

January 1 Feeder Cattle Supply
1977 to 1978

% change

Thousand Head

Calves less than 500 pounds

35,295

34,531
1,322
33,209

32,363
1,351
31,012

29,574
1,614
27,960

Total

22,851
9,100
13,751

24,476
11,542
12,934

24,942
11,125
13,817

24,746
11,775
12,971

Total Supply

49,046

46,143

44,829

40,931

On Farms

36,291

On Feed^

996

Total

Steers & Heifers 500

pounds and over^
On Farms

On Feed^

1

Estimated U.S. steers and heifers.
replacements.

2

Not including heifers for cow

Another factor related to the cattle inventory which will affect outlook,
especially for selected categories of both live animals and meat, is commercial
slaughter. Historically, about 60 percent of commercial slaughter is in the
fed category, another 10 percent in the non-fed category and 30 percent in the
cows and bulls category.
(See Figure 4)

Currently, expectations are that total fed slaughter will not change
drastically but reductions are expected in the other two categories, especially
cow slaughter. Thus, a higher percentage of the slaughter will be in the
fed category. Feedlots will bid for the non-fed animals and producers will
hold back more replacement heifers and cull fewer cows as they attempt to
rebuild cattle numbers. This probably will mean that feeder cattle prices will be
high relative to other cattle prices, and breeding stock will also be relatively
high priced. In the meat category, ground beef will probably be priced high
relative to meat cuts.

Once again, price projections are subject to change. How^^ver, given the
level of inventories, favorable consumer demand and prices of substitutes,

one must arrive at an optimistic outlook.

As for hogs, there has been a change
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in cattle outlook in recent months.

The degree of optimism can be discerned

from price changes in the futures market, as noted in Tables 5 and 6, Also
note the affect of the March hog report on the cattle contracts between March 21
and March 28.

The same warning noted for the hog industry also could be made for the
cattle industry. Price increases at the producer level will encourage expanded

production.

While this is a slower process for cattle than for hogs, it could

occur and cause a repeat of the price picture noted for the last three years.
Also, if prices get too high, some consumers might switch to other meats or
eat less meat.

Table 5.

Daily Closing Prices for Fed Cattle Contracts
Date

Contract

Month

Oct.

27

Feb.

8

March 21

March 28

April 3

April

38.90

44.32

52.02

53.67

51.17

June

39.90

45.60

50.25

52.80

49.67

August

40.00

45.90

49.35

51.72

49.57

October

40.12

45.87

48.45

50.45

December

40.47

46.20

50.52

49.05
49.05

46.15

48.90
49.10

50.50

49.50

46.32

49.25

50.80

49.37

January
February

Table 6.

Daily Closing Prices for Feeder Cattle Contracts
Date

Contract

Oct.

Month

27

Feb.

8

March 21

April

42.30

49.20

May
August
September

42.40

49.17

54.30
53.80

October

March 28
57.00
56.17

April 3
55.65
53.50

42.40

49.25

54.12

56.27

53.60

42.40

47.45

54.35

55.90

' 42.40

49.17

53.40

53.45
52.65

55.10

November

49.80

55.60

53.37

January

50.32

56.90

54.65

Summa]

The outlook for both hogs and cattle can best be described as optimistic.

The optimism primarily is the result of factors on the supply side, especially
reduced inventories. Other factors can have an effect, but this probably will
be less noticeable than that caused by inventory changes.

RAILROADS

IN SOUTH DAKOTA

Agri-Business Day, S.D.S.U.
April 4, 1978
A. Clyde Vollmers

Assistant Professor, Agricultural Marketing
South Dakota State University

The current situation facing South Dakota rail users can be described very
briefly, its critical. In this presentation I will first examine the present
conditions, then explore factors contributing to the situation and conclude by
examining alternative courses of action available to South Dakota shippers.
An Assessment of the Current Railroad Situation

The largest railroad in South Dakota, the Milwaukee, which operates 48% of
the state's trackage, is bankrupt and the Chicago and Northwestern railroad which
operates 34% of South Dakota's trackage is encountering serious financial
difficulties.

Although car shortages seem to be a perpetual part of grain marketing, the
present shortage is the most serious since the Soviet grain sales of 1972. The
carrier with the greatest shortage is apparently the Burlington-Northern which
carried 16% of the 1976 carloadings in South Dakota.

Continuing abandonments are rapidly changing the railroad map in South
Dakota and this trend is likely to continue into the future (see Figure 1).
By May 1, 1977, in response to 4-R's requirement, the railroad companies
collectively classified over 50% of the trackage in the state as potentially
subject to abandonment. \>/hile the classification is constantly changing, the
May 1, 1978 classifications are approximately;
219 miles approved for abandonment
468 miles filed for abandonment

459 anticipated abandonment application within 3 years
690 potentially subject to abandonment and subject to further study
Factors Creating the Present Situation In Transportation

Effective policy, in the long run, must be directed at the causes rather

than the symptoms of the problem.

This section will examine some of the many

factors which have contributed to the present conditions which exist in the
South Dakota rail system.

1) For many years the railroads have been compelled to serve branchlines
which have been operating at a loss, creating a drain upon total profit. When
abandonments have been approved, the procedures have been slow extending the
profit drain.

FIGURE 1,
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2)

The railroads have maintained duplicate lines serving essentially the

same area.

Given the high costs of line maintenance, the continuation of

duplicate lines imposes an unnecessary cost upon the system.
3) The regulation of rates has sometimes had the effect of reducing
potential revenue to the railroads. While grain rates are regulated for the
railroads, rates for the ir competition, trucks and barges, are not.
This
leaves the railroads in an inflexible, uncompetitive position which has reduced
potential revenue for th e railroads and resulted in some freight moving by
alternative modes which

could have been shipped more economically by rail,

Delays in granting rate changes have also had a significant effect on revenues,
During inflationary peri ods this becomes especially important as increased
operating costs cannot b e recovered immediately through rate adjustments.

4)

The practices and regulations which control the relationship between

different railroads and between railroad and shippers increase costs while re
ducing the effectiveness of rail service. For example, the current car short

age has been created, in part by deteriorating right-of-ways which lengthen
turn around time, a lack of investment in rail cars and inefficient use of

existing cars. This has resulted from the low per diem rate which encourages
railroads to use cars belonging to other carriers and low demurrage rates which
allow shippers to use cars for storage.

5)

Over 50% of railroad revenues are expended for labor, but labor

practices have often failed to adjust to changes in technology which would reduce
labor requirements.

6)

Poor rail management and an uncertain future have curtailed innovations

and adaptations to new technology, organizational improvements and changes in
market conditions.

7)

Various policies and practices have benefitted other modes at the

expense of railroads.

Construction and maintenance of the ways have been pro

vided and at least partially subsidized for most other modes while railroads
have provided and paid taxes on the rail lines.

8)

Rail service involves high fixed costs and relatively small variable

costs which means that a

decline in traffic redu ces revenue substantially more

than it reduces expenses.

To maintain liquidity many railroads have responded
to reduced traffic by attempting to reduce costs
However, the cost reductions
have usually involved a reduction in the quality of service which leads to a
further traffic decline.

And the line is caught in a continuing spiral of

traffic reduction and service reductions which o ften leads to its abandonment.

Alternative Courses of Action Available to South Dakota

Each rail line is a unique case, differing in use, importance and future.
Thus, one alternative will not suffice for all lines and various alternatives
need to be explored.

1)

For lines with very light traffic and little potential for increased

traffic flows, the most viable alternative may be to accept the unprofitability
of the line, agree to abandonment, and depend upon alternative modes for service,
Some lines which have been abandoned could become necessary in the future as

technological and market changes occur. To ensure that the rlghts-of-way are
available at a reasonable cost, selected rights-of-way can be purchased and

retained by the state or "rail banked,"
However some lines which are currently under study may be salvageable
through the joint efforts of the railroads, shippers and the public sector.
following are some methods available to help preserve branchlines.

The

2) By attracting new industry the viability of the total rail line system
can be improved.
But industrialization probably will not help preserve branchlines because most firms will not locate on lines which are potentially subject
to abandonment.
This also indicates the importance of the state rail plan
which was recently completed. The state has prioritized lines and made a
commitment to preserve selected lines.
The state commitment provides an
environment in which industries can feel confident about locating on a line.
The new industry provides additional revenue to support the line.
Thus rail
viability is a self-fulfilling prophesy.
If shippers believe a line to be weak
and do not locate on it, it becomes weak.
Similarly, if they believe a line
is viable and locate on it, it becomes stronger and the expectations are fulfilled.

3)

Decreasing weight limits or increasing taxes on trucks would, by

increasing the cost of truck transportation, shift traffic back to railroads.
IvTiile this could help preserve rail service, it would also increase the cost
of shipping goods.

4)
serving
because
service
imposed

Many branchline shippers recognize that the railroads are losing money
them. Yet, they also feel continuation of rail service is necessary
it is cheaper than alternative modes.
Therefore, rather than lose
through abandonment the shippers could propose that a surcharge be
on all traffic over a particular line.
If the surcharge is sufficient

to eliminate the railroad's loss while not increasing the shippers' costs to
the level of the alternative modes, both benefit.
The railroad by making a
profit and the shipper by still paying favorable transportation rates.

5)

Occasionally local shippers are indifferent to rail service and the

community may be the major benefactor of rail service or there are a large
number of benefactors who do not have the ability to work together. For example,
a firm may relocate rather than pay higher transportation rates, creating
unemployment and a reduced tax base.
If the loss of income and taxes to a
community is greater than the subsidy needed to continue rail service, a local
subsidy may serve the interest of the community.

6) Purchasing an abandoned line and operating it as a short line is another
option that may have significant advantages in some circumstances over subsidizing
a line. An organization of rail users could result in more efficient
scheduling and better services.
Expanded volume could be promoted reducing
average costs of shipping. Services might also be better tailored to user needs.
Some of the disadvantages in terms of administrative overhead, and restrictive
practices of large railroad companies might be overcome.

7)

Railroads usually look at the profitability of a total branchline and if the

total branch is unprofitable, they may petition for abandonment.
Some rail lines
which are not viable contain segments which are or could be viable for another

carrier.

Thus shippers (or the ICC) could either persuade the existing carrier

to maintain service on part of the line or they could persuade another carrier
to take over the line.

8) Provision and maintainence of the way requires an extremely large capital
investment for any mode and while the highways, waterways and airways have

been provided by the public sector, railroads have been required to provide
and maintain the rail lines.

In response, several proposals have recently been

presented at the national level under which the public would provide and/or
maintain the rail line. Most proposals include a stipulation which calls for
the railroads to pay a user charge similar to trucks and airlines.
This would

substantially reduce the capital requirements for railroads and change the fixed
costs to a variable cost based upon traffic flow.

Funding Sources

As with most public problems, the various solutions to the railroad problem
requires capital. Rehabilitation and preservation of all rail lines in South
Dakota is financially prohibitive, and the railroads do not have the capital
required to upgrade service for most lines in the state. This leaves a
significant part of the financial burden upon the public sector and those
shippers dependent upon rail service.
The federal government under the A-R Act, the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, provides funds which can be utilized for rail
freight assistance on lines which have been approved for abandonment. During
the fiscal year July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1978, the federal share of any
assistance program is 90%. The federal share is reduced to 80% in the next
fiscal year and to 70% between July 1, 1979 and June 30, 1981. While each
branchline is an individual case, it now appears that the state will not provide
the matching funds in most cases.
Rather local interests will have to raise
the funds.

South Dakota has received 1.649 million dollars in the current fiscal

year under the 4-R Act.
During the 1978 legislative session, the South Dakota legislature enacted
legislation which is similar to the Iowa plan.
Under this law shippers, the

state, and the railroad each contribute 1/3 of the cost of rehabilitating a
rail line.

As the line generates revenue the railroad will pay back the shippers

and the the state.

Financing under either the 4-R Act or the Iowa Plan requires local partici
pation. To facilitate revenue raising by local units of government, the 1978
legislation facilitates establishment of regional local bonding authorities
which can secure the capital needed to preserve and upgrade rail facilities
by issuing bonds. However, the future of most branchlines still rests with the
users.
If shippers want to preserve their rail service they will have to

"put their money where their mouth is." On a line with more than one shipper
this will require some collective action vehicle, possibly a rail user's
association.

The association could represent users in negotiations and could

serve as the vehicle to assess and collect rehabilitation and other funds

from shippers.

Conclusion

While South Dakota faces a rail crisis, it also has alternatives available
to solve the problems. But retaining service on individual branchlines will

require action on the part of shippers.

If you want to preserve service in your

area you can contact the following agencies:
For Planning

South Dakota Department of Transportation
Division of Railroads

Transportation Building
Pierre, SD

57501

For Abandonment

South Dakota Public Utility Commission
Transportation Division

Capitol Building
Pierre, SD

57501

(Phone 773-3161)
To Work Together With Other Shippers
South Dakota Rail Users Association
P.O.

Box 665

Yankton, SD

57078

